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Note: Tribal Consent and the Lease of Indian Lands
for Federal Power Projects
There are approximately 452,000 American Indians living on
or adjacent to the 536 Indian reservations in this country.'
These Indians are the beneficial owners of more than 50 million

acres of reservation land. 2 Yet the Indian people rank lowest
"on virtually every scale of measurement" of all racial and ethnic
groups in terms of employment, income, education, and health. 3
Federal efforts to ameliorate the plight of the Indians have increasingly focused on the economic potential of developing reservation resources. 4 The leasing of reservation lands for resource development purposes plays an instrumental role in tapping the economic potential of Indian reservations. By combining Indian manpower and land resources with non-Indian capital
and technology these leases have benefited both the Indian tribes
and their lessees. 5 But the leasing of Indian reservation land
has also created a complicated legal web among the many parties
affected by the lease. The state government, the local government, the Department of the Interior, and other federal agencies
-in addition to the lessee and the Indian tribe lessor-often have

significant interests in the lease of reservation lands. Questions
frequently arise concerning the extent of each party's authority
and the standards governing the exercise of that authority. The
lease of Indian reservation lands for the construction and operation of hydroelectric power plants presents a typical example of
the overlapping authority and undefined roles characteristic of
this uncertain area of the law.
1. A. Soxm, A

cAN INIAxs Am FuERAL AnD 4 (1971).

2. According to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the total is

50,475,906 acres. Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty: SecretarialDiscretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 ST.N. L. -REV.
1061,
1062 n.5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Chambers & Price].
3. See The American Indians-Message from the President of the
United States, 116 CoNG. REc. 23,131 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Presidential Message].

4. In addition to programs administered by the BIA,federal agen-

cies have expended over 150 million dollars on grants and loans during
the past six years to further economic development on Indian reservations. See Chambers & Price, supra note 2, at 1064 n.17.
5. In fiscal year 1973, Indians derived nearly 28 million dollars
from nonmineral surface leases. See id. at 1063. See generally Comment, Economic Development of Indian Reservations: Increasing Tribal
Participation,Limiting FederalControl, 48 Tu.. L. REv. 649 (1974).
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The Federal Water Power Act of 19206 gave the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) the authority to issue 50-year licenses
for the construction and operation of hydroelectric power plants
on "any part of the public lands and reservations of the United
States,"'7 including "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations."
A substantial number of the projects licensed pursuant to this authority are located on the tribal lands of Indian
reservations.9
In 1934 the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) vested the
power to "prevent the sale, disposition, lease or encumbrance of
tribal lands" in all Indian tribes organized under its provisions. 10
Whether this power to prevent alienation limits the authority
of the FPC to grant licenses to power companies for the use of
Indian tribal lands remains unresolved. This question involves
more than an exercise in statutory construction. The issue of
an Indian tribe's control over its lands inevitably raises broad
questions of national Indian policy and the proper role of federal
agencies in implementing that policy. Moreover, the conflict
between the FPC and the Indian tribes has become increasingly
important as the public has developed a greater concern for both
Indian rights and sources of energy. The issue is especially significant in view of the fact that a number of the original 50-year
licenses are now approaching expiration."
6. 16 U.S.C. § 791(a) et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act
of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063). The Federal Water Power Act
of 1920 was amended in 1935 and the title was changed to the Federal
Power Act. 49 Stat. 687 (1935).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 797 (e) (1970).
8. Id. § 796(2).
9. Chairman John N. Nassikas of the FPC states that hydroelectric
structures and facilities of federally licensed power projects occupy
tribal lands on the Lac Courte Oreilies (Wis.), Flathead (Mont.), LaJolla
(Cal.), Rincon (Cal.), San Pasqual (Cal.), Uintah (Utah), Ouray
(Utah), Warm Springs (Ore.), and Gila River (Ariz.) Indian Reservations. Hydroelectric project transmission or control lines cross the
tribal lands of numerous other Indian reservations. Hearings on Federal Protection of Indian Resources Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1677, 1679-84 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
10. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
11. The Washington Star reports that by the end of 1976 nearly
40 hydroelectric project licenses will have expired. The Star suggests
that "important conditions could be attached to the renewals calling for
new recreational uses, environmentally cleaner operations or higher
payments to those who own the land-in a number of cases Indian
tribem" The Star cites two examples:
In Wisconsin, the Lac Court Oreilles Indian Band of the
Lake Superior Chippewa Tribe has asked the Federal Power
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The FPC has recently rejected the proposition that tribal
consent is required before a license may be issued for a power
project on tribal lands. 12 In its opinion the FPC expressed concern about the potential disruption of the efficient functioning
of the integrated network of nationally regulated hydroelectric
power plants that could result from the conditioning of power
projects on tribal approval. The Commission observed that any
such disruption would threaten the "comprehensive development
of the water resources of the Nation."'1 Refusing to believe that
Congress ever intended that result, the Commission concluded
that the overriding policy of the Federal Power Act precluded a
requirement for tribal consent.
In reaching this conclusion the FPC did not consider the
symbolic and economic interests of an Indian tribe in the licensing of federal power projects on tribal lands. The Indian tribes
have a significant symbolic interest in protecting tribal sovereignty against an administratively imposed alienation of tribal
lands. 14 They also have an economic interest in increasing their
participation in the development of reservation resources. Unlike
many other leases, a lease for a hydroelectric power plant does
not generally produce economic benefit for the lessor tribe. If
power companies were no longer unilaterally able to secure the
use of tribal lands, they would presumably be compelled to offer
sufficient economic incentives to induce a tribe to give its consent
Commission to deny a new license to Northern States Power
Co. for continued operation of a dam on tribal lands.
In California, the Pit River Indians, who claim their lands
were taken from them illegally, want the FPC either to deny a
license renewal for several huge Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
hydroelectric plants or allow relicensing, only under a host of
conditions.
Aug, Indians: Roadblock for Utilities, The Washington Star, Jan. 16,
1972.
12. Northern States Power Co., 50 F.P.C. 753 (1973). The case involved an extensive legal battle for control of the Chippewa Flowage in
northwest Wisconsin. The Chippewa Flowage, the largest inland waterway in Wisconsin, consists of about 30,000 acres with a development
value of more than 50 million dollars. Northern States Power Company
operated a reservoir which is located in part on the flowage and in part
on tribal lands of the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewas. The
power company's license to operate this reservoir expired in August,
1971, and the Lac Courte Oreilles Indians argued that the FPC could
not legally issue a new license for the use of this land without the Indians' consent. Intervening on behalf of the Lac Courte Oreilles Indians in Northern States Power Co. were the BIA and several environmental and Indian interest organizations.
13. Id. at 774.
14. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
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for the project.1 5
This Note will examine the nature and extent of federal and
tribal authority over Indian tribal lands. Specific attention will
be directed to the question whether this concurrent authority
is being exercised properly when federal power projects are
licensed on Indian tribal lands. It will be proposed that tribal
sovereignty can be promoted while the efficient utilization of the
nation's water resources is still protected by requiring tribal consent before licensing a power project on Indian tribal lands, but
subjecting the withholding of that consent to judicial review.
This Note will then explore two alternative proposals for accommodating responsible tribal participation within the statutory
framework of the present licensing procedure.
I. FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER TRIBAL LANDS
Federal authority over tribal lands finds its basis in article
IV of the Constitution, which provides: "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
15. At the present time, if an Indian tribe disapproves of the renewal of a license for the use of its lands, there are two procedures by
which the tribal lands involved in the project might be transferred back
to the tribe. First, 16 U.S.C. § 808(b) (1970) authorizes the FPC, upon
the expiration and nonrenewal of a license, to license the project for
temporary nonpower use by a new licensee who will reimburse the old
licensee for its "net investment." The statute then directs the FPC to
terminate its supervision over the project whenever "a State, municipality, interstate agency, or another Federal agency is authorized and
willing to assume regulatory supervision of the lands . . . ." Under
this procedure, the Indian tribe itself could reimburse the old licensee
for its net investment and the FPC would then, by the issuance of a
temporary nonpower license, transfer supervision of the project to the
Department of the Interior for the ultimate benefit of the tribe. Second,
16 U.S.C. § 807 (1970) provides that the United States, upon recommendation by "any Federal department or agency," may "take over" a particular project by reimbursing the licensee for its "net investment" in
the project. Under this procedure, the Department of the Interior could
recommend that Congress exercise its right to "recapture" a particular
project and then hold in trust the federally owned lands for the benefit
of the Indian tribe.
The Secretary of the Interior has already requested the recapture of
two federal power projects. He has advised the FPC that the Department desires to recapture the Escondido Canal Project No. 176, in order
to protect the water and land interests of the Indians living there, and
he has also requested that the FPC institute proceedings to recapture
the lands and waters involved in the Chipuewa Flowage Project No.
108, so that the lands are returned to the United States to be held in
trust for the use and benefit of the Lac Courte Oreilles Chippewa Indians. Hearings,supra note 9, at 1716-17.
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United States. . . ."16 The Constitution vests responsibility for
Indian affairs primarily in Congress'17 and to a more limited
extent in the President.' s As Chief Justice Marshall concluded
in Worcester v. Georgia, "[t]hese powers comprehend all that
is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the
Indians."'19
The courts have characterized the relationship between the
United States Government and the Indian tribes as that of
trustee-beneficiary and guardian-ward. Chief Justice Marshall
introduced both concepts, 20 and the courts quickly accepted them
because of a need for some principles to explain the dependent,
yet semi-autonomous relationship of the Indian tribes to the
federal government. The trusteeship and guardianship rationales became the principal justifications for upholding the claim
of plenary congressional authority over the Indians and their
tribal property. 2 ' Consequently Congress may dictate the condi16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Indian tribal lands are included under
"[p]roperty belonging to the United States" and thus are directly subject to the power of Congress.
17. Id. See also id. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power
. . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ......
18. "The President... shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ....
" Id. art. II, § 2.
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
20. The trustee-beneficiary concept is derived from the doctrine of
"title by discovery." Chief Justice Marshall introduced the doctrine to
American law in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823):
[The Indians'] rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil, at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,
was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
Thus, the United States Government holds legal title to all Indian lands
with the Indians reserving the right as beneficiary to use and occupy
the lands.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), Chief
Justice Marshall stated: "[The Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
21. The plenary character of congressional power over various
aspects of Indian affairs has been recognized on many occasions. See
Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1943) (extension of tax
immunity to Indian trust lands); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S.
535, 538-39 (1938) (prohibition of intoxicants in Indian country); United
States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 469-71 (1926) (regulation of crimes
committed by or against Indians on a restricted allotment); Sunderland
v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1924) (restraints upon sale of
land by Indian allottees); Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88, 96 (1918) (reimposition of restraints upon the sale of land by an heir of an Indian
allottee); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-47 (1913) (prohi-
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tions under which tribal land may be used,22 may convey tribal
land to third parties, 23 and may restrict alienation of the land
by the Indians. 24 Moreover, it has been held that congressional
discretion over tribal lands is political in nature and not subject
to traditional judicial scrutiny.2 5 Thus the only constraint upon
congressional power to dispose of tribal lands is apparently the
fifth amendment guarantee that private property will not be
26
taken for public use without just compensation.
As trustee of Indian tribal lands, Congress has assumed a
fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the tribes. 27 As
guardian, Congress has accepted general responsibility for pro28
tecting the Indians and providing for their general welfare.
Despite the extensive power of Congress over tribal lands, however, its specific obligations remain difficult to define and enforce, because they are entirely self-imposed.2 9 As a result, the
concepts of federal trusteeship and guardianship have proven to

bition of intoxicants in Indian country); Tiger v. Western Investment
Co., 221 U.S. 286, 310-17 (1911) (restriction of alienation of Indian
lands); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 533, 566-68 (1903) (allocation
of Indian tribal lands); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135
U.S. 641 (1890) (right of eminent domain to extinguish tribal right to
occupy land); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (extension of criminal laws to reservation).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1970).
23. United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417 (1937).
24. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a, 397-98 (1970).
25. The power existing in Congress to administer upon and
guard the tribal property, and the power being political and
administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a
question within the province of the legislative branch to determine, and is not for the courts.
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902).
26. See Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358 (1937);
United States v. Cree Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935); Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); cf. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). But cf. note 77 and text accompanying note 81 infra.
27. [T]his court has recognized the distinctive obligation of
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with
[Indians] .... In carrying out its treaty obligations with the

Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a mere
contracting party. Under a humane and self-imposed policy
which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct ...
should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary
standards.
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
28. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-09 (1970).
29. For a discussion of the procedural difficulties in enforcing Indian resource claims, see Note, Toward a New System for the Resolution
of Indian Resource Claims, 47 N.Y.UL. REv. 1107 (1972).
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be fertile sources of federal authority over tribal lands while providing ineffective checks on that authority.
Congress has delegated its trusteeship and guardianship responsibilities for the Indians to the Secretary of the Interior."0
The Secretary, in turn, has departmentally assigned initial responsibility for the Indians to the Commissioner on Indian
Affairs.3 1 Prior to 1934, the power of the Secretary of the
Interior to dispose of tribal lands was comparable to his authority
over public lands in general. The Secretary could issue mineral
leases of tribal land,32 sell the timber on the land,3 3 and even
allocate tribal property to individual members of the tribe.3 4
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193435 and subsequent legislation 36 significantly narrowed the scope of the Secretary's
authority. Essentially, his role was changed from that of manager to that of protector. In this new capacity the Secretary
can no longer unilaterally direct the disposition of tribal resources, although he can still prevent any dissipation of Indian
land by the improvident actions of the Indians themselves. Thus,
the approval of the Secretary is required for all leases of Indian
30.

43 U.S.C. § 1457 (1970); see UNr=s

GANIZATION MANuAL

STATES GoVERNmENT

OR-

260 (1973).

In addition to the direct authority over Indian lands delegated to
the Department of the Interior, Congress has conferred incidental jurisdiction over Indian reservations to other Federal agencies. One example
is the licensing of hydroelectric power plants, discussed in text accompanying notes 6-9 supra. Such licensing triggers the Commission's attendant supervisory jurisdiction over that part of the reservation encompassed within the project.
31. The BIA was created as part of the War Department in 1824
and transferred to the Department of the Interior when the latter was
established in 1849. The Snyder Act of Nov. 2, 1921, ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970)), specifically provided for appropriations for the activities of the BIA. The scope and character of the authorizations contained in this Act were broadened by the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-18, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970)).
32. Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 26, 41 Stat. 31 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 399 (1970)).
33. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 7, 36 Stat. 857 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 407 (1970)).
34. Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. But see
25 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
35. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-18, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970)).
36. See, e.g., Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, § 1, 52 Stat. 347 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1970)): "[Indian lands] may with the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council ....
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lands3 7 and all other contracts relating to tribal property38
Furthermore, in the event of a lease or other encumbrance of
Indian land, he may insist on any conditions he deems necessary
39
for the protection of the affected tribe.
The Secretary of the Interior is also responsible for protecting Indian lands and resources from encroachment by third
parties. 40 However, the Department of the Interior is plagued
with conflicting interests that hinder vigorous enforcement of
Indian rights. It is composed of several specialized bureaus, including Mines, Land Management, Sport Fisheries and Wildlife,
and Reclamation, as well as Indian Affairs.4 1 The underlying
purpose of all these bureaus and the general purpose of the De42
partment is to manage public lands in the public interest.
Conflicts between the pursuit of this goal and the promotion of
Indian property interests are inevitable. 43 Moreover, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) does not have its own legal counsel; legal matters for the Bureau are handled through the office
of the Solicitor of the Interior. 44 Consequently, when a conflict
arises affecting the private interests of Indian tribes in the use
of their land, there is no independent legal advocate to argue
the Indians' case and to ensure that Indian interests are not
routinely sacrificed to competing demands. 4 5 In short, the bureaucratic structure responsible for implementing the Government's fiduciary duty to the Indians has proved inadequate to
46
protect the Indians, their land, and their resources.
37. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a, 397-98, 415a (1970).
38. Id. §§ 81, 85.

39. Id. § 415a; 16 U.S.C. § 797 (e) (1970).
40. This fiduciary duty to represent Indian property interests is
shared with the Department of Justice. See 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1970);
28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970).
41. UNITED STATES GoVERNMNT ORGAMZATION MANUAL 261 (1973).
42. Id. at 260.

43. See generally Comment, Interagency Conflicts of Interests: The
Perilto Indian Water Rights, 1972 LAW & Soc. ORDER 313.
44. See generally Hearings,supra note 9, at 233-49, 1702.
45.

In this context President Nixon said:

"There is considerable

evidence that the Indians are the losers when such situations arise."
PresidentialMessage, supra note 3, at 23,135 (1970). There are, however, promises of reform. A new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs has been created, and an Indian Water Rights
Office has been established. An agreement has also been reached
whereby the Department of Justice will file briefs with the Department of the Interior whenever it has a different view as to the federal
trust duty in cases involving a reservation's natural resources. See
Hearings, supra note 9, at 1702.
46.

In particular, federal water projects, whether initiated by the

FPC, the Bureau of Reclamation, or the Army Corps of Engineers,
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II. TRIBAL AUTHORITY OVER TRIBAL LANDS

A.

THE CONCEPT OF TRImAL SOVEREIGNTY

Tribal sovereignty can be defined as the right of Indian tribes
to govern their own land and affairs according to laws and
policies developed by the tribes themselves. The authority of
tribal councils to manage and regulate the use of reservation
lands and the jurisdiction of tribal courts to adjudicate disputes
arising on the reservation are the two major incidents of tribal
sovereignty and are frequently governed by the same general
principles. Although tribal sovereignty is in essence a political
concept, the term has also developed legal import as a doctrine
47
influencing judicial opinions.
Each Indian tribe began its relationship with the United
States Government as a sovereign power, capable of declaring
war and conducting international relations with other sovereign
powers. The initial treaties between the United States and the
various Indian nations clearly acknowledged this sovereignty as
well as the validity of the Indians' aboriginal title to their
illustrate the Department's ineffectiveness in protecting Indian interests. For example, the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Reservation
flooded one-fourth of the entire reservation, inundating the tribe's most
fertile lands and partitioning the reservation into five sectors. The
project economically and emotionally shattered the Indians living on
the reservation. See CiTizENs' ADVOCATE CENTER, OuR BROTHER's KEEPER:
THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 69-72 (E. Cahn ed. 1969).
Other examples of federal water projects antagonistic to Indian interests in their lands and waters include the Yakima Reclamation Project, which diverted thousands of acre-feet of irrigation water from the
Yakima Reservation; the Central Arizona Project, which is expected to
flood 12,000 to 15,000 acres of the Fort McDowall Reservation, including
all buildings on the reservation and virtually all the irrigable land;
and a river diversion project on the Winnebago Reservation which is
expected to flood 200 to 800 acres of Winnebago lands and prevent the
Indians from developing their own recreational facilities. See Testimony Before the Water Resources Council, San Francisco, March 13-14,
1972, Concerning Proposed Principles and Standards for Planning Water
and Related Land Resources, in Hearings, supra note 9, at 1730-32.
In response, the Water Resources Council, composed of the Chairman of
the FPC and the Secretaries of the Army, Interior, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health, Education and Welfare, has proposed standards
recognizing the authority of the tribal council to veto planned federal
projects affecting Indian lands and waters. Proposed Amendments to
Water Resources Council's Principles and Standards for Planning Water
and Related Land Resources Projects Affecting Indians, in Hearings,
supra note 9, at 1728-29. The Council was established pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1962a (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 22, 1965, Pub.
L. 89-80, tit. 1, § 101, 79 Stat. 245).
47. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973) and text accompanying note 60 infra.
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lands. 48 As the country expanded westward and the idea of a
separate sovereignty within the geographical boundaries of the
United States grew unacceptable, it became necessary for the
United States to limit and subordinate, militarily and politically,
the exercise of Indian sovereignty. Consequently, the Indian
people were reduced to the status of a conquered nation subject
to the plenary authority of Congress. 49 What dominion the
Indian tribes continued to exercise over their lands they exercised by congressional grace and not by legally indefeasible right.
Tribal sovereignty came to be viewed as merely those powers
which Congress had not yet extinguished. 50
As conquered nations, the Indian tribes have seen their
property rights fluctuate with the Government's shifting Indian
policies. 51 Oscillation between policies of assimilation and
48. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creek Nation, August 7, 1790, 7 Stat.
35; Fort Harmar Treaty with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, and Sac Nations, January 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28.
49. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
50. See generally F. CoEmN, HANDBooK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
(1942).
51. Until 1871, treaties were the principal instruments used to
define the fundamental legal relationship between the United States
Government and the Indian tribes. At the time the majority of these
treaties were negotiated, the Indians were generally considered impediments to progress. The intense and often violent competition for land
control made the Indian a natural enemy. The Government's solution
was to confine the Indians to specific reservations. Dictated by the exigencies of the times, this solution produced two immediate results.
First, it minimized the violent confrontations with the Indians which
could only have ended in complete annihilation of the Indian race. Second, since geographic confinement was inconsistent with a hunting and
gathering lifestyle, it tended to induce the Indians to adopt a more
"civilized" agricultural economy.
The Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, authorized the
President to divide the Indian reservations into parcels which would
then be allotted in severalty to the individual members of the particular
tribe. The allotted land would be held in trust by the Government for
a minimum of 25 years, after which the parcels would be patented in fee
simple to the individual Indians. The effect of the Act on the general welfare of the Indians was disastrous. From its inception in 1887
until its repeal in 1934, the Indians lost over 90 million acres of reservation land. The reservation land not allotted was deemed "surplus" and
made available for sale to the white settlers and railroads. 25 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1970). Moreover, the idea of individual ownership was foreign
to Indian culture, and the inexperience and resulting confusion of the
individual Indian rendered him particularly susceptible to the high pressure tactics of land dealers. See generally Kelly, Indian Adjustment and
the History of IndianAffairs,10 ARiz. L. REv. 559 (1968).
The tragic dissipation of Indian land was finally stopped in 1934
when Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 46179 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat.
984). Senator Wheeler, cosponsor of the Act, stated that its central pur-
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segregation,5 2 coupled with a propensity to dispose of problems
on an ad hoc basis,5 3 has prevented any stable definition of tribal
property rights and has contributed significantly to the social,
economic, and cultural disintegration of American Indians." It
now appears, however, that the emerging policy is to preserve
and promote Indian tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
In an address to Congress in 1970 President Nixon stated that
self-determination among the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual termination: "This,
then, must be the goal of any new national policy toward the
Indian people: to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy
without threatening his sense of community."" 5
There is evidence that protection of tribal sovereignty is indeed becoming a significant feature of the fiduciary duty that
Congress has assumed toward the Indian people. Thus the
promotion of tribal sovereignty has played a major role in the
pose was "to stop the alienation, through action by the Government or
the Indian, of such lands, belonging to ward Indians, as are needed for
the present and future support of the Indians."

78 CoNG. REc. 11,123

(1934). To effect this goal, the Act directed the Secretary of the Interior
"to restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any In-

dian reservation." 25 U.S.C. § 463 (1970). Additionally, the Act gave
the tribal council the power to "prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or

encumbrance of tribal lands." Id. § 476. The Act also included provisions relating to tribal self-government and was in essence a congressional affirmation of tribal sovereignty.
The only significant statutes impinging upon Indian land rights
that have been enacted since 1934 are the Termination Acts of 1954.
See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, § 10, 68 Stat. 252 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 899 (1970)). The Termination Acts were a reversion to the
assimilation policy of the Allotment Act. Under the Acts, specific Indian reservations were to be dissolved, the tribal land divided, and the
members of the tribe subjected to the jurisdiction of the states. The
termination program, like the allotment scheme, was a failure and consequently was abandoned in 1958. In an address to Congress, President
Nixon stated:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because it produces bad practical results, and because the mere
threat of termination tends to discourage greater self-sufficiency
among Indian groups, I am asking the Congress to . . . expressly renounce, repudiate and repeal the termination policy
PresidentialMessage, supra note 3, at 23,132.
52. See generally Comment, The Indian Battle for Self Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 445 (1970).
53. For example, Congress has frequently enacted legislation specifically dealing with only a single Indian tribe. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§
495-1300(e) (1970).
54. See Comment, supra note 52.
55. PresidentialMessage, supra note 3, at 23,132.
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enactment of recent Indian legislation.5" At the present time
Congress is considering a bill that would provide for Indian administration of BIA and Public Health Service Indian programs.
This proposed legislation is indicative of the renewed concern in
Congress for tribal sovereignty as it is specifically designed "to
promote maximum Indian participation in the government of
Indian people" and "to achieve ... government by consent in
57

the Indian country.1
The Supreme Court has also indicated an increasing awareness of and sensitivity to the policy of tribal sovereignty. The
Court recently focused on the nature of tribal sovereignty in the
companion cases of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission

5

and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.59

In McClanahan

the Court struck down a state income tax on revenue generated
by reservation Indians from reservation resources. In Mescalero
the Court upheld a state gross receipts tax on a ski resort operated by an Indian tribe on nonreservation land. The McClanahan Court recognized the relevance of the "Indian sovereignty
doctrine," although it used the doctrine only as a "backdrop" for
interpretation of treaties and statutes which it considered dispositive.60 Using this same approach in Mescalero, the Court
refused to extend the tribe's tax immunity to activities conducted
off the reservation.
The Supreme Court again considered the policy of Indian
56. See, e.g., the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. (1970);
Congress rejected a proposed definition of wilderness which would have

allowed the inclusion of Indian lands in the Wilderness system. See
OuTDooR RECREATION REsouRCEs REvIEw CoMMIssIoN, STUDY REPORT No.
3, WILDERNESs AND RECREATION-A REPORT ON RESOURCES, VALUES, AND
PROBLEMS 3 (1962). See also the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
1321 (a), 1322 (a) (1970), which requires tribal consent for state assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction. The latter has been interpreted
as having "been tailored by Congress to the purpose of enhancing the
civil liberties of individual Indians without unduly undermining [the
present federal objective of preserving] Indian self-government and cultural autonomy." McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 632 (D. Utah

1973). See generally Comment, The Application of the One-man, Onevote Standard of Baker v. Carr to Tribal Elections, 58 MInN. L. REV.

668 (1974).

57. S. 3157, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reintroduced as S. 1017,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally Dean, The Consent of the
Governed-A New Concept in Indian Affairs?, 48 No. DA. L. REV. 533
(1972).
58.

411 U.S. 164 (1973).

59. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
60. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Conm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973).
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self-determination in Morton v. Mancari.61 Upholding the employment preference for Indians required of the BIA by section
12 of the IRA, 62 the Court observed:
The overriding purpose of [the IRA] was to establish machinery
whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater degree
of sell-government, both politically and economically. 63
In deference to this policy and in recognition of the Indians'
unique historical relationship to the federal government, the
Court unanimously refused to apply a racial discrimination
analysis and upheld the statute as "rationally designed to further
Indian self-government."(6 4
These recent cases establish a revitalized, yet conservative,
role for tribal sovereignty. Although the Court appears very
willing to use the concept of tribal sovereignty as a legal doctrine
to justify decisions favorable to the Indians, it remains reluctant
to extend the influence of the doctrine beyond the boundaries
of the reservations. At the same time, the Court seems to be
adopting a narrow and technical approach to questions involving
Indian rights, stressing a "more individualized treatment of
particular treaties and specific federal statutes."6 5 Consequently, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty does not appear to be
of sufficient weight to determine independently the Court's conclusion in any particular case. The doctrine's major contribution
is its influence on the interpretation of applicable treaties and
statutes.
Thus viewed, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is not in competition with the plenary authority of Congress, but rather is
an expression of congressional intent to use that authority to
preserve the Indian tribe as a political, social, and economic entity. Consequently, the courts' proper function is to implement
and promote tribal sovereignty except in those instances where
Congress has clearly manifested a contrary intent.
B.

FACTORS INFLUENCING TRmAL SOVEREIGNTY

Because of the uneven historical development of the legal
status of Indians66 and the disparate treatment of particular
Indian tribes,67 the extent of tribal sovereignty over tribal lands
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

94 S.Ct. 2474 (1974).
25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970).
94 S. Ct. at 2478-79.
Id. at 2485.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
See note 51 supra.
See note 53 supra.
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cannot be categorically determined. Deference to the concept of
tribal sovereignty varies according to the circumstances of each
case. The character of the adverse party, the status of the reservation, and the nature of the right invoked are all factors which
influence the extent of that deference.
1.

The Characterof the Adverse Party

One of the major variables affecting the recognition given
tribal sovereignty is the status or character of the party asserting
an interest adverse to the Indian tribe. As with most principles
of Indian law, the significance of the adverse party's character
derives from the Indian tribe's unique historical status.
The Supreme Court initially confronted the issue of Indian
political-legal status in 1831 when the Cherokee Indian Nation
attempted to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. 68

Since article III of the Constitution clearly gives the

Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits involving "foreign
states," 39 the problem facing the Court was to define the status
of the Cherokee Nation-and thereby the status of all Indian
tribes-under the Constitution. The result was the creation of
a new legal category for Indian tribes:
[The Indian tribes] may ... perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert
a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point
of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile,
to the United
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 0
Two distinct and potentially conflicting concepts are con-

tained in this description: first, the concept of internal sovereignty suggested by the term "domestic dependent nation";
second, the concept of subservience inherent in the relationship
of guardian and ward. The Court's decision as to which characterization to favor depends upon the relationship of the parties
before it. Where the issue involves the assertion of state or local
power over the Indian tribe, the Court has emphasized the

domestic dependent nation status. 7 1 Thus, the Court has re68.
69.
70.
71.
(1974);
U.S. (6

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 94 S. Ct. 772
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
Pet.) 515 (1832).
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fused to allow state or local governments to tax7 2 or condemn
Indian lands, and has denied state courts civil and criminal jurisdiction over the internal affairs of Indian tribes.7 4 Where the
issue involves the assertion of congressional power over the
affairs of a tribe, the Court has emphasized the guardian relationship and has allowed Congress free reign in the exercise of its
authority.7T As a consequence, Indian rights vis-a-vis the federal government are much different than Indian rights vis-a-vis
state or local governments. The character of the adverse party
is thus a threshold consideration in determining the extent of
recognition given to tribal sovereignty.
2. The Status of the Reservation
The extent of tribal control over Indian lands also depends
upon the source of a tribe's interest in the land. While almost
all Indian property rights ultimately derive from the Indians'
aboriginal possession of the land, aboriginal title by itself creates
a very limited property interest. As the Supreme Court concluded in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,70 "Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress, may be extinguished by the Government with77
out compensation."
Thus, recognition that the land in which the Indians assert
an interest is designated a reservation is only the initial step
78
in the analysis. Not all Indian reservations are of equal status.
There are different considerations for reservations created by
executive order and for those created by treaty or act of
Congress.7 9 While it is within the power of the President or the
72. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973);
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
73. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). Indian lands
are also exempt from state or local zoning regulations. See 25 C.F.R.
8 1.4 (1974).
74. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
See also 25 U.S.C. §8 1321-22 (1970).
75. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
76. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
77. Id. at 288-89. Aboriginal title does confer on the Indians standing to bring a trespass action against intruders. Edwardsen v.Morton,
369 F.Supp.1359 (D.D.C.1973).
78. See F.ConmN, supranote 50, at 291.
79. In 1871 Congress dispensed with treaties as a means of dealing
with Indian affairs and established legislation as the official channel for
all future expressions of Indian law. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970) (originally
enacted as Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat.
566).
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Secretary of the Interior without congressional authorization to
order lands withdrawn from the public domain for the use of
Indians, 0 the property rights created in a tribe by such an executive order are subject to termination without compensation at
the will of the President or Congress.8 ' Moreover, the Supreme
Court has held that even when the executive withdrawal is congressionally sanctioned, a tribe still does not have the power to
prevent the sale or other compensated disposition of an executive
order reservation.8 2 In contrast, a treaty or act of Congress vests
in an Indian tribe a compensable property interest in the reservation land.8 3 The extent of an Indian tribe's property interest
above this minimum interest depends upon the particular definition of tribal property rights employed in the creating instrument. The language used to define the character of the estate
guaranteed to an Indian tribe varies considerably, ranging from
fee simple4 ownership to various limited rights of use and oc-

cupancy.

8

Regardless of the language employed in any particular treaty,
tribal property rights based solely on a treaty are not inviolable.
Even though treaties are identified in the Constitution as part
of the supreme law of the land,85 the doctrine of treaty abrogation seriously dilutes the effective force of Indian treaties. The
rationale for the doctrine is that since Indian treaties and federal
statutes are of the same constitutional rank, then, as in the case
of all laws emanating from an equal authority, the later in time
prevails over any inconsistent provisions of the earlier. In upholding the power of Congress to contravene the provisions of
an Indian treaty by subsequent legislation, the Supreme Court
has said:
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian
treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only
when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves,
that it should do so.86
80. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
81. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S.
169 (1947); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
See generally Comment, Tribal Property Interests in Executive-Order
Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 69 YALE L.J. 627 (1959).

82. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949).

infra and accompanying text.

See note 135

83. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
84. See generally F. CoHEN, supranote 50.
85. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.

86. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
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Abrogation of an Indian treaty is ultimately a question of
judicial interpretation. A court not only must construe the later
legislation, but also must consider the impact of the earlier
treaty. The courts have adhered to numerous rules of construction that are aimed at preventing the abusive application of the
doctrine. As Chief Justice Marshall stated, "the language used
in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice. 8 7 Indeed, in determining the meaning of treaties,
any ambiguous or technical language is to be interpreted "in
the sense in which [it] would naturally be understood by the
Indians."88 Moreover, in analyzing the effect of subsequent legislation on treaty guarantees, the courts have consistently held
that "the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be
lightly imputed to the Congress."8 9 When this rule is applied
in conjunction with the rule that ambiguous legislation is generally "to be construed in the interest of the Indian" 90 a presumption against abrogation results.
The degree of legislative specificity required to rebut this
presumption is unclear. In Menominee Tribe v. United States91
the Supreme Court held that a statutory provision that the laws
of Wisconsin "shall apply to the tribe and its members in the
same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within
its jurisdiction" was not sufficiently specific to abrogate the hunting and fishing privileges guaranteed to the tribe by treaty.92
On the other hand, in The Cherokee Tobacco93 the Court held
that the language of the Internal Revenue Act of 1868, which
stated that the "laws imposing taxes on . . .tobacco . . .shall
be held and construed to extend to such articles produced anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the United States," was
"as clear and explicit as could be employed" and therefore
abrogated the tobacco taxation immunity granted to the Cherokee Indians by treaty. 4 Thus, it appears that the degree of specificity which is required to rebut the presumption against abroga87. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832). See
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942) ("in a spirit which
generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the
interests of a dependent people"). See also Squire v. Capoeman, 351
U.S. 1 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
88. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
89. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413
(1968); Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934).
90. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909).
91. 391U.S.404 (1968).
92. Id. at 412, citing 25 U.S.C. § 899 (1970).
93. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
94. Id. at 618, 620.
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tion is a matter of fine judicial discretion. Although the presumption against abrogation and the similar presumption against
implied repeal help to protect an Indian tribe whose reservation is created by treaty or statute from inadvertent intrusions into its sovereignty, these presumptions do not limit the
plenary authority of Congress over tribal lands. Consequently,
the extent of an individual tribe's sovereign control over its tribal
lands depends not only on whether the reservation is protected
by treaty or statute, but also on whether the provisions of that
treaty or statute have been abrogated or repealed by a later
statute.
3. The Nature of the Right Invoked
The extent of a tribe's control over its land appears to vary
according to the nature of the rights invoked by the Indians. An
example of a power which is strictly limited is the tribe's power
to alienate tribal property. That power is subordinate to the
general power of the Secretary of the Interior to restrain any
type of alienation he deems improvident.95 Thus the tribal
council's exercise of affirmative sovereignty over tribal lands is
generally limited to suggesting land leases to the Secretary of
the Interior9 6 and internally regulating the use of the land by
97
tribal members.
In contrast -to the subordination of this power of alienation is
the special recognition given to Indian water rights. In Winters
v. United States,98 the Supreme Court established the doctrine
that Indian tribes reserved under their treaties the continuing
right to use the water floving through their reservation. The
idea of confining the Indians to semi-arid reservation lands and
then depriving them of the water which made those lands habitable affronted the Court's sense of fairness. 99 The effect of the
95. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
96. There are exceptions to the general requirement of secretarial
approval. For example, in 1970 Congress authorized the Tulalip Tribe
to conclude leases of tribal lands for terms, of up to 30 years without
secretarial approval. Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-274, § 3(b),
,84 Stat. 302 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 415b (1970)).
97. In addition to the authority over the use of land, tribal sovereignty allows an Indian tribe to define conditions of tribal membership,
to regulate domestic relations of members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, and to administer justice. See generally Cohen, IndianRights and the FederalCourts, 24 M£nw. L. REv. 145 (1940).
98. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
99. See generally Bloom, Indian "Paramount"Rights to Water Use,
16 RocK- MT. MnwEaAL L. INST. 669 (1971); Veeder, Indian Prior and
ParamountRights to the Use of Water, id. at 631.
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Winters doctrine is to give to an Indian tribe a prior right to
the water on or flowing through its reservation. Moreover, this
right does not depend on the particular status of the reservation.
In United States v. Walker River Irrigation District,10 0 -theWinters doctrine was extended to statutory and executive order
reservations.'01 In ,addition, the amount of water to which the
Indians are entitled is measured by the amount required "to ir02
rigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations."
Thus the Winters doctrine gives an Indian tribe the right to prevent any diversion of water that would impair the agricultural
productivity of its reservation lands.
III. THE FEDERAL POWER PROJECT LICENSE

A. THE ROLE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Congress first authorized the leasing of Indian reservation
lands in 1891103 and continued to enact piecemeal legislation on
the subject until 1955.104 In 1955 Congress significantly broadened the permissible purposes and extended the permissible
duration of such leases 1 5 but did not repeal any of the previous
piecemeal legislation. 0 6 All of the leasing statutes require
100. 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
101. We see no reason to believe that the intention to reserve
[water rights] need be evidenced by treaty or agreement. A
statute or an executive order setting apart the reservation may
be equally indicative of the intent.
Id. at 336.
102. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). For a discussion
of the proposition that the Indians' right to water extends beyond that
needed for agricultural purposes, see Ranquist, The Effect of Changes
in Place and Nature uf Use of Indian Rights to Water Reserved Under
the "Winters Doctrine," 5 NAT. REsouRCEs LAW. 34 (1972).
103. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 795 (partially codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1970)).
104. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 393-403 (1970).
105. Any restricted Indian lands, whether tribally or individually owned, may be leased by the Indian owners, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, for public, religious,
educational, recreational, residential, or business purposes, including the development or utilization of natural resources in
connection with operations under such leases ....

All leases

so granted shall be for a term of not to exceed twenty-five
years ....

[Such] leases with the consent of both parties may

include provisions authorizing their renewal for one additional
term ....
Id. § 415.
106. Nothing contained in sections 396 and 415-415d of this title
shall be construed to repeal any authority to lease restricted
Indian lands conferred by or pursuant to any other provision
of law.
Id. § 415d.
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tribal consent as a condition for any leases. Specifically, tribal
consent is required when Indian tribal land is leased for purposes
of mining,10 7 oil and gas extraction, 08 or farming. 109 However, Congress has not clearly defined the extent of tribal authority over tribal lands leased for a federal power project. The
Federal Power Act (FPA) and the IRA are too imprecise to compel a conclusion. This ambiguity leaves substantial latitude for
consideration of the problem within the framework of general
principles and policies of Indian law.
1.

The Characterof the Adverse Party

If a state were to attempt to impose a power project on an
Indian tribe, the tribe's quasi-sovereign status would presumably
operate to prevent the intrusion." 0 A power project, however,
arises in a context in which the party asserting an interest adverse to the Indian tribe is a federal administrative agency. An
Indian tribe's sovereignty vis-a-vis a federal agency is not clear.
If the federal agency's action is specifically mandated by Congress, the plenary nature of federal authority preempts tribal
sovereignty."' If the federal agency's action is not clearly mandated by statute, then the validity of the action must be evaluated in terms of the relevant statutes and treaties. The doctrine
of tribal sovereignty provides the proper "backdrop" for the interpretation of those statutes and treaties." 2
2. The Status of the Reservation
The second variable which is considered in defining the respective roles of the Indians and the FPC is the status of the
reservation. The significance of this variable is illustrated by
the Supreme Court's decision in FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation." 3 Tuscarora involved an Indian tribe's attempt to enjoin
the condemnation of its lands by a licensee of the FPC. The
tribe argued that its lands could not be condemned under
section 21 of the FPA" 4 because a reservation could be leased
only upon an FPC finding that the power project would be con107. Id. § 396a.
108. Id. § 398.
109. Id. § 402a.
110. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
companying note 71 supra.
111. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
112. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
113. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).

See text ac-
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sistent with the purpose of the reservation. 115 The Court
rejected this argument on the ground that the Tuscarora lands
were not reservation lands created by treaty and protected by
the trust relationship thereunder,"" but had been purchased
in fee by the Indians and were therefore subject to condemnation."17 The Court concluded:
All members of this Court-no one more than any other-adhere
to the concept that agreements are made to be performed-no
less by the Government than by others-but the federal eminent
domain powers conferred by Congress upon the Commission's
licensee, by § 21 of the Federal Power Act, to take such of the
lands of the Tuscaroras as are needed for the Niagara project
do not breach the faith of the United States, or any treaty or
other contractual agreement with the Tuscarora Indian Nation
in respect
to these lands for the conclusive reason that there is
none.1' 8
Although the Court discussed the distinction between treaty
and nontreaty Indian lands, it based its holding on the more
fundamental distinction between reservation and nonreservation
lands. Reservation status is the threshold requirement for the
invocation of federal trust responsibility for Indian land. The
legal validity of a tribe's sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States
depends at the very minimum on some formal recognition of that
sovereignty by the United States Government. This recognition
is formalized by the reservation of land for the Indian tribe. The
Court's finding that the Tuscarora lands were not a reservation
foreclosed further consideration of the tribe's sovereignty to control the use of the land.
The Tuscarora Court did not address the issue of whether
the FPC could license a power project on reservationlands without the consent of the tribe. The traditionally limited nature
of the rights accorded tribes living on executive order reserva115. Id. § 797 (e). See text accompanying note 163 infra.
116. 362 U.S. at 121 n.18.
117. Id. at 123. In addition, the Tuscarora Indians argued that the
eminent domain powers exercisable under the FPA did not apply to
Indians or Indian lands because under the rule of Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 94 (1884), general acts of Congress do not apply to Indians unless
such application is expressly mandated. However, the Court found
that later cases had seriously undermined the Elk V. Wilkins rule, and
that the direct reference to Indian reservations in other provisions of
the FPA would have rendered the rule inapplicable in any event. 362
U.S. at 123. The Indians also relied on a federal statute which provided
that Indian lands could not be taken without the express and specific
consent of Congress. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1970). The Court held the
statutory prohibition inapplicable to the United States Government and
its agencies. 362 U.S. at 123-24.
118. Id. at 124.
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tions suggests that this type of reservation could be taken for
a power project without the consent of the tribe.1 9 In contrast, Congress has given special recognition and promises to
tribes living on treaty and statute reservations. In addition, with
the enactment of the IRA Congress vested in these -tribes
the power to control the disposition of tribal lands and resources. 1 20 Although Congress clearly has the power to take
lands from the Indians,' 21 it has exercised this power "only in
accord with prior treaties, only when the Indians themselves consent to be moved, and only by Acts which either specifically refer
to Indians or by their terms must include Indian lands."' 22
While it is clear that the FPA "neither overlooks nor excludes
Indians or lands owned or occupied by them,' 23 the provisions
of the Act must be interpreted in light of the presumption against
abrogation or implied repeal of a tribe's treaty and statutory
12 4
rights.
3.

The Nature of the Right Invoked

The nature of the right invoked is the third variable that
frequently influences the recognition given tribal sovereignty
over tribal lands. In the context of federal power project negotiations, an Indian tribe might assert the right to prevent an unwanted incursion into tribal lands by a licensee of the FPC. The
tribe's exercise of this right would be in the nature of preserving,
as opposed to dissipating, the reservation land, and therefore
would not be restricted by any of the disabilities traditionally
associated with Indian status. 25 Moreover, the notion of an
impoverished Indian tribe struggling to protect its shrinking,
tribal resources from further dissipation could prove to be an
influential equitable factor in an area of law characterized by
broad judicial discretion.
The special recognition accorded a tribe's right to protect its
water rights is a significant factor in the consideration of a power
project. The operation of a hydroelectric power facility causes
119. See note 135 infra and text accompanying notes 76-82 supra.
120. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). See text accompanying notes 129-39
infra.
121. United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417 (1937). See
text accompanying note 23 supra.
122. United States v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 131 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 118.
124. See text accompanying notes 85-94 supra.
125,
ee text accompanying notes 95-97 supra,
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abnormal fluctuations in water level both above and below the
dam. This fluctuation could impair the agricultural productivity
of an Indian reservation and thereby violate the tribe's rights
under the Winters doctrine. 126 Moreover, the Office of Indian
Water Rights, recently created in the Department of the Interior,
has demonstrated its intention to vigorously review and litigate
any infringement of Indian water rights.1 27 Thus there is a
strong possibility that an Indian tribe could successfully enjoin
128
or limit the operation of the power plant.
Under the existing licensing procedure a utility company
operating a power project on an Indian reservation incurs the
risk of seeing the efficiency of its project crippled if the Indian
tribe successfully asserts its water rights. However, the risk is
avoided when tribal consent is obtained prior to the commencement of a hydroelectric project. The tribe's consent to a project
would operate to estop it from later asserting its water rights
against a project operated in accordance with the terms of that
consent.
B.

APPLICATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES

Tribal sovereignty derives much of its content from statutory
sources. The most significant legislation in the area of tribal
land control is the IRA. 129 The overall purpose of the Act is
"to give the Indians an opportunity to take over the control of
their own resources"; it seeks "to give the Indians the control
of their own affairs and of their own property; to put it in the
hands either of an Indian council or in the hands of the corporation to be organized by the Indians.' 30 Section 16 of the IRA
contains the most relevant congressional statement of tribal
rights and powers:
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe
shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following
rights and powers: ... to prevent the sale, disposition, lease,
or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal
126. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
127. See Hearings,supra note 9, at 1716-17.
128. See, e.g., id., where it is reported that the Office of Indian Water
Rights has requested the FPC to require the Escondido Mutual Water
Company and the Vista Irrigation District to change their operations
and cease those practices which deprive the Indians of their water supply.
129. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
130. 78 CONG. REc. 11,124-25 (1934).
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assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the
Federal, State, and local Governments. 131
It is primarily on this statutory foundation that an Indian tribe
can base the argument that tribal approval is required before
132
tribal lands can be leased for power projects.
Section 16 of the IRA does not apply to every Indian tribe
or to every reservation. In order for an Indian tribe to enjoy
the powers and benefits conferred by section 16 it must organize
and operate under a constitution that is "ratified by a majority
vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians
residing on such reservation . . . at a special election authorized
and called by the Secretary of the Interior.' 1 33 The constitution
must then be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 34 In
addition to the eligibility limitations, the Supreme Court has held
that IRA powers do not extend to Indian tribes living on execu3 5
tive order reservations.1
Another potential constraint on the application of the IRA
is the sovereign exclusion doctrine. In Tuscarora the Supreme
Court held that a statutory prohibition against alienation of
Indian land did not apply to the FPC because the statute contained an implied sovereign exclusion which exempted federal
agencies from its coverage. 36 Conceivably this sovereign exclusion doctrine could also be invoked in interpreting the scope
of the IRA. But since private individuals and states have never
131. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
132. See Northern States Power Co., 50 F.P.C. 753, 764 (1973).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
134. Id.
135. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949). Hynes is
the only case in which the Supreme Court has specifically addressed the
scope of section 16. The dispute centered on the designation of a tract
of land by the Secretary of the Interior as a reservation for the Karluk
Indians of Alaska. The tract of land selected included coastal waters
where Alaskan fisheries had operated for many years. The imposition
of this reservation in 1936 and the attendant restriction of fishing privileges seriously threatened the economic survival of the fisheries. The
Court held that the Secretary could not legally deprive the companies
of their source of fish by granting exclusive fishing rights to the Indians. The Court stressed the limited nature of property rights created by executive order reservations, and in rejecting the argument that
section 16 of the IRA applied to executive order reservations, stated:
We think, however, in view of the breadth of the coverage of
the Wheeler-Howard Act [IRA] that this language [section 16]
would be effective only where there has been specific recognition by the United States of Indian rights to control absolutely
tribal lands.
Id. at 107.
136, See note 117 supra,
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had the power to sell tribal land or to dispose of tribal assets,'1 37
exemption of federal agencies from the application of the IRA
would leave it meaningless. Moreover, the IRA expressly confers
upon the Indian tribes the power "to negotiate with the Federal,
State and local Governments." 138 A power to negotiate implies
a power to refuse proposals advanced during negotiation; accordingly, it would be reasonable to conclude that when Congress
granted Indian tribes the power to negotiate with the federal
government for the use of tribal lands, it also intended to include
in that grant the right to reject a proposal by a federal agency
for the use of tribal lands.139 The terms and conditions governing the issuance of power licenses, however, are contained in
section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act of 1935.140 Even though
the FPA was enacted only one year after the IRA, tribal consent
is not mentioned in section 4(e) as one of the conditions for the
licensing of a power project on Indian lands. Consequently the
FPC has not considered tribal consent as a necessary condition
when it licenses power projects on tribal lands.

IV. EVALUATION OF EXISTING
LICENSING PROCEDURE
With increasing frequency, Congress has endorsed the promotion of tribal sovereignty and self-determination as the guiding national policy behind the economic development of Indian
reservations.1 4 ' At the same time Congress has recognized the
need for comprehensive national regulation of water resources.1 42 Thus, when a hydroelectric project is licensed on
137. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1970).
138. Id. § 476 (emphasis added).
139. Senator Wheeler's comments on the purpose of the IRA suggest that Congress did intend to confer on the Indian tribes a veto power
over the use of their lands. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
140. [L]icenses shall be issued within any reservation only after
a finding by the Commission that the license will not interfere or
be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was
created or acquired, and shall be subject to and contain such
conditions as the Secretary of the department under whose
supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the
adequate protection and utilization of such reservations ....
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
141. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
142. Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. (1970).
In First Iowa Hydroelec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), the Court
held that even though the FPC's jurisdiction was not by nature totally
exclusive, it was nevertheless sufficient to enable the Commission to
'perate free of restricting or duplicating state regulations. See also
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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tribal lands, the interest in protecting tribal sovereignty is opposed by the public interest in developing and maintaining
uniform and uninterrupted hydroelectric power production. The
present procedure for licensing power projects on Indian reservations does not provide a proper balance between these competing
interests. For example, when the FPC licensed a power project
on the Lac Courte Oreilles Reservation in 1920, the Commission,
and the Secretary of the Interior by implication, 43 sanctioned
the flooding of Indian villages and sacred burial grounds, the
complete destruction of the tribe's wild rice economy, and the
grossly inequitable rental payment of 100 dollars per month for
more than 525 acres of tribal land. 44 The Lac Courte Oreilles
tribe objected to the action but was unable to prevent the licensing of the project or even modify its drastic effect on the
reservation. In short, the licensing procedure proved to be
totally inadequate protection for the interests of the Indian tribe.
The inadequacy of the existing licensing scheme does not
necessarily warrant placement of the final decision concerning
continued operation of a power project wholly within the discretion of the Indian tribe. Regions of the country are dependent
on the electricity generated by power plants located on Indian
tribal lands. 4 5 Allowing the unreviewable, and thus potentially improvident, termination or even disruption of the electrical service provided by these power projects would be as unsatisfactory as the existing decision process. Some form of
compromise is required. In formulating this compromise it must
be remembered that there are two distinct licensing situationsthe original licensing of the construction and operation of a
power project, and the renewal licensing of a power project
already in operation. The balance between the interests of tribal
sovereignty and hydroelectric power production in each of these
situations is different. Prior to the original licensing of a hydroelectric project there is no substantial financial investment by the
143. The FPC must obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Interior before it can license a power project on an Indian reservation.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970). The Secretary approved the license for the
construction of the power plant on the Lac Courte Oreilles Reservation
despite the strenuous objections of the tribe. Lac Court Oreilles Indian
Reservation FPC Project No. 109 (mimeograph copy from Chippewa
Flowage Investigations by Inland Lakes Demonstration Project, U. of

Wis. &Wis. Dep't Nat. Resources).

144. See generally Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, Lac Courte Oreilles Band's Struggle to Regain its Land
and to Achieve Compensation for Past Abuses (Position Paper relative
to the Chippewa Reservoir Federal Power Project No. 108).
145. See, e.g., notes 11-12 supra.

19743

INDIAN LAND LEASES

utility company, no reliance on electrical service by surrounding
communities, and no unusual hardship involved in locating an
alternative site. The policy of promoting economic self-determination and sovereignty over tribal lands would thus favor
the requirement of tribal consent at the original licensing stage.
At the renewal licensing stage the factors of financial investment, community reliance, and relocation hardship may outweigh
the need to protect tribal sovereignty. Nevertheless, the failure
of the existing licensing procedure to respond to Indian interests
suggests the need for a different allocation of responsibility for
the renewal decision. This new framework should accommodate
the presumption that an Indian tribe will exercise its sovereignty
in a responsible and constructive manner. The procedure should
provide that a tribal council's determination of the best use of
its tribal land will be upheld during the renewal licensing of a
power project, unless the FPC can prove on appeal that the withholding of tribal consent for a particular project is arbitrary and
unreasonable or will result in irreparable injury to the public.
Shifting the burden of proof to the FPC maximizes recognition
of tribal sovereignty but retains the flexibility needed to protect
against serious disruption in the development and utilization of
national water resources.
V.

REFORMATION OF THE LICENSING PROCEDURE

A. FOUNDATION FOR A TRIBAL CONSENT REQUIREMENT
Congressional legislation would be the most appropriate
means of balancing the policies which are brought into focus
when power projects are licensed on Indian lands. Until such
legislation is forthcoming, it is the responsibility of the courts
to effectuate a reasonable compromise of the competing interests
through a clarification of the ambiguous statutory language.
The courts could sustain a tribal consent requirement within the
existing statutory framework under two distinct theories. The
courts could interpret the FPA in par materia with the IRA:
general rules of construction and a specific reference to the IRA
in the FPA14 6 may suggest that Congress intended tribal consent to be a condition for the licensing of power projects on tribal
lands. Alternatively, the courts could view the purpose of an
Indian reservation as that of providing an arena for the exercise
of tribal sovereignty. From this perspective the leasing of res146. 16 U.S.C. § 803 (e) (1970).
53 infra.

See text accompanying notes 152-
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ervation land without the consent of the tribal government
could be perceived as "inconsistent with the purpose for which
such reservation was created '147 and 'thereby prohibited by
section 4 (e) of the FPA.
1. An In Pari Materia Approach
Section 15 (a) of the FPA authorizes the Commission to issue
a license only after satisfying the terms and conditions required
by the "then existing law."' 48 The IRA is currently a part of
the existing law. Therefore it can be argued that the FPC cannot
issue a new license without the tribal consent required by the
IRA. To escape this conclusion the Commission has argued that
the grant of authority contained in the Federal Power Act of
1935 to issue licenses on Indian reservations impliedly repeals any
provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 that would
seem to limit that authority.

49

However, this

argument

ignores basic principles of statutory construction. Courts do not
favor repeal by implication and will avoid finding an implied
repeal if there is another reasonable construction. 50 Moreover,
the general rule of liberally construing ambiguous statutes in
favor of the Indians' 5' militates against any implied repeal of
an Indian tribe's IRA rights. Recognition of tribal consent as
merely another condition on the exercise of the Commission's
licensing authority would be a reasonable construction of the two
statutes to avoid an implied repeal.
Harmonization of the two statutes, however, is complicated
by a specific reference to the IRA in section 10(e) of the
FPA.152 That section, entitled "Annual charges payable by
licensees," provides in part:
147. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
148. Id. § 808a.
149. The legislative history of the 1935 Federal Power Act does not
illuminate the intention of Congress concerning the interaction of the
Act with the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. Senator Wheeler, a cosponsor of both the IRA and the FPA, stated:
Mr. President, I do not think I shall go into a discussion of
title II of the bill [FPA]. In the committee there was very
All the
little if any discussion with reference to it ....
way through title II it is specifically provided that the FPC
shall have the power to do this or do that with respect to the
matters over which the Comnmission or Congress has jurisdiction
at the present time.
79 CONG. REc. 8444 (1935).
150. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
151. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
152. 16 U.S.C. § 803e (1970).
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[W]hen licenses are issued involving the use of Government
dams or other structures owned by the United States or tribal
lands embraced within Indian reservations the Commission
shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior in
the case of such dams or structures in reclamation projects and,
in the case of such tribal lands, subject to the approval of the
Indian tribe having jurisdiction of such lands as provided in
Section 476 of Title 25, fix a reasonable annual charge for the
use thereof, and such charges may with like approval be readjusted by the Commission at the end of twenty years after the
project is available for service and at periods of not less than
ten years thereafter ....
153

The appearance of this reference to the IRA: in the "annual
charges" section of the FPA could be interpreted as limiting the
tribe's role to participation only in the determination of rent.
It could thus be inferred that the tribes are excluded from the
actual licensing decision. But the reference is not restrictive in
tone. This suggests that the intent of Congress was not to limit
tribal powers but to extend to a tribe a new right to participate
in the readjustment of rent, in harmony with the purpose of the
154
IRA to give Indians control of their own resources.
The only case 5 5 to interpret section 10(e) in reference
to the issue of tribal consent for federally licensed power projects
is FPC v. Montana Power Co. 156

In that case the court of ap-

153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Arguably section 10(e) could be construed to give a tribe the
option of refusing to approve any annual charge fixed by the Commission, thereby empowering the tribe to effectively block the licensing of
a project. But see text accompanying note 160 infra.
155. Case law touching on the specific issue of tribal consent for
power projects on Indian reservations is sparse. The Supreme Court
first encountered the subject in 1955 when the State of Oregon asserted
that its jurisdiction over public lands, granted to it by a prior federal
statute, precluded issuance of an FPC license without the state's consent. FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). The Supreme Court avoided
a direct confrontation between the two federal laws by finding that the
land was reservation land, as distinguished from public land, and thus
not included under the statute upon which the state premised its claim.
In explaining its decision, the Court observed that "[t]he Indians [had]
given their consent to the project." Id. at 444. The Court was not required to clarify whether that consent would have been an essential
condition to the issuance of the license.
The only other Supreme Court decision on the jurisdictional relationship between the FPC and an Indian tribe is FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). Although the Tuscarora case involved
an Indian challenge to the authority of the FPC to license power projects
on Indian lands, the power project licensed was not on reservation
lands. Therefore the Court again was not required to determine the
influence of the IRA on an Indian tribe's control over the licensing of
power projects on reservation land. See text accompanying notes 11318 supra.
156. 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971).
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peals addressed the question whether rental readjustments for
a particular power project would be determined by the Commission pursuant to section 10 (e) or by arbitration, as provided in
the original license for the project. The court held that the
procedure outlined in the 1935 power act controlled.157 The
power company had asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction to review the readjustment since section 10 (e) vests the
Secretary of the Interior with the power to disapprove determinations of annual charges by either the Commission or the court.
The court rejected this argument because the Secretary had in
fact accepted the Commission's readjustment and had disclaimed
any power to overrule the decision of the court. The court then
stated:
The Secretary's approval under the 1928 law, like the approval
of the Secretary and of the Indian Tribes referred to in Section
10(e) of the Act, is manifested initially by the concurrence with
the licensee which must exist in order for the application for the
original license (either as filed, or as modified to take account
of objections found in the original filing) to be approved by the
Commission. It is manifested as to readjustment of rentals by
the filing with the Commission, or acquiescing in presentation to
the Commission, of an application requesting readjustment. The
readjustment decision is made by the independent regulatory
agency assigned this function by Congress, subject to review by
the court of appeals. After approval of the presentation of the
application for readjustment the only further recourse of the
Secretary or the Tribes is the right of appeal provided by law
for the correction of errors made by the commission. 158
The Montana Power court outlined two separate and distinct
situations in which the approval of the Indian tribe and the
Secretary of the Interior would be relevant. The first situation
is the initial licensing; the court stated that concurrence among
the Indian tribe, the Secretary, and the licensee "must exist in
order for the application for the original license ... to be approved by the Commission."'159 The second situation is the periodic readjustment of rent; the court made it clear that the Indian
tribe or the Secretary might request a rental readjustment, but
157. Id. at 749.
158. Id. at 756. The 1928 law that the court referred to was the
Interior Department Appropriation Bill, ch. 137, 45 Stat. 212-13, which
contained a proviso "[t] hat the Federal Power Commission is authorized
in accordance with the Federal Water Power Act and upon terms satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior, to issue a... license... for the
use, for the development of power, of power sites on the Flathead Reservation ....

."

The legislative history of the Act does not explain why

specific enabling legislation was passed for this project when it would
appear that the 1920 Act was sufficient.
159. 44 F.2d at 756,
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that the primary responsibility for the decision lies with the
FPC, subject only to judicial review.1 0
Limiting the Indian tribe and the Secretary of the Interior
to the remedy of judicial review comports with a practical understanding of licensing. Federally licensed power projects typically
involve investments by the licensee of several million dollars.
Twenty years after the license is issued and every ten years
thereafter the rent is periodically adjusted to properly reflect
the appreciated value of the lease. 161 If the Montana Power
court had accepted the power company's assertion that the
Secretary of the Interior, and presumably the Indian tribe, had
unreviewable discretion in determining the rental readjustment,
then it would have in effect allowed the Secretary or the Indian
tribe the option of demanding unreasonable increases in rent at
the readjustment intervals. The licensee would be forced to
either meet an exorbitant rent demand or abandon the entire
project. The Montana Power court effectively avoided such a
result by recognizing that responsibility for the rental readjustment decision is in the FPC, subject to review by the courts.
What is not clear is whether this same decision and review
procedure is applicable to the initial determination of the rental
charge. At the original licensing stage the applicant does not
have a substantial financial investment at stake. Thus there is
not the same compelling reason for the FPC to exercise exclusive
responsibility for the decision. In fact, at this initial negotiation
stage there is no apparent substantive difference between a
power company's request for a power project license and an
16 2
effort by any other private party to lease Indian tribal lands.
Therefore, even though section 10(e) speaks of a "like approval"
at the two stages, the Montana Power court's carefully drawn
160. This point was again stressed in Montana Power Co. v. FPC,
459 F.2d 863, 874 (1972), when the court elaborated upon the roles of the
Indian tribe and the Secretary of the Interior in the rental readjustment
procedure:
The --Secretary is a public figure who could not insist onwithholding approval unless the rental rate* to' be paid were
unreasonable. Considering the applicable statutes together he
may approve a rental offered by the Company, and he may
negotiate for an approved consensual arrangement; but if there
is no agreement and the matter goes to the Commission, the
Secretary can refuse to approve the rate fixed by the Commission only' by "seeking court review of its determination.
As is the situation with the Tribes, the Secretary can participate
as a party and avail of the provisions for judicial review.
161. 16 U.S.C. § 803(e) (1970).
162. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra,
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distinction between the approval manifested during the original
licensing and the approval manifested during rental readjustment supports the conclusion that section 10(e) does not eliminate tribal consent as a requirement for leases of Indian reservation lands.
2. A Reservation PurposeApproach
Before a license may be issued for the use of reservation land
the Commission is required by statute to find "that the license
will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which
such reservation was created or acquired . ... ,163 Traditionally
the FPC has analyzed the question of interference or inconsistency with the purpose of an Indian reservation in strictly utilitarian terms.6 4 For example, the purpose of an Indian reservation is to provide living space for the Indian tribe residing there;
if the construction of a power project would inundate too much
of the reservation acreage, then the granting of a power license
would "interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose of the reser65
vation."
If the validity of the utilitarian analysis of reservation purpose is conceded, the only debatable issue is whether a power
project inundates so much land as to interfere with the tribe's
use of the reservation. This question of fact is decided by the
FPC. In the case where the Commission's judgment as to what
interferes with the purpose of the reservation differs substantially from the judgment of the Indian tribe, the only recourse
the tribe has is judicial review of the Commission's finding.
Since administrative determinations of fact are not overturned
if supported by substantial evidence, 6 it is unlikely that the
Commission's finding of fact can be reversed on appeal. Consequently, under a utilitarian definition of reservation purpose an
Indian tribe is entirely dependent on the Commission's opinion
of what interferes with the reservation.
163. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
164. See, e.g., Power Authority of N.Y., 21 F.P.C. 146 (1959).
165. The acreage of reservation land that would be used by the
power project is perhaps the single most influential factor. Id. See
also Lazarus, Indian Rights Under the Federal Power Act, 20 FED. B.J.
217, 219-20 (1960).
166. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 94 S. Ct. 2328 (1974). In Iowa v.
FPC, 178 F.2d 421, 427 (8th Cir. 1949), the court stated that on judicial
review the court may "not retry the controversy, [or] substitute its judgment for that of the [FPC] as to any doubtful or debatable question of
fact."
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On the other hand, if the utilitarian definition of purpose
is not conceded, a quite different argument can be made. The
purpose of an Indian reservation is to provide a confined but
real arena for the exercise of tribal sovereignty; 167 if the tribal
government rejects a proposed power project on the reservation,
then licensing of such a project would interfere and be inconsistent with the purpose of the reservation as an arena for tribal
168
sovereignty.
The question of which definition of reservation purpose is
the proper premise from which to make the required finding is
ultimately a question of policy rather than law. The traditional
utilitarian analysis of reservation purpose conveys the notion of
the Indian as an incompetent ward-the idea that the Indian
tribes are incapable of deciding for themselves how best to utilize
and manage the resources of their reservations. Under the utilitarian approach the FPC decides how to develop those water
resources and it fulfills its federal trust obligation so long as it
gives some consideration to the physical and economic needs of
the Indians. 169
In contrast, the tribal sovereignty conception of reservations
assumes a more significant federal trust responsibility. It assumes that the purpose of the trust relationship is to preserve
and promote the Indian tribe's status as a distinct, self-governing
society. If, as the Supreme Court has indicated, the doctrine
167. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), where
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the purpose of the federal-Indian
trust relationship, and thus the purpose of the Indian reservations, was
to preserve the status of the Indian tribe as a distinct, self-governing
society.
The sovereignty and economic functions of an Indian reservation
are not, of course, mutually exclusive. In commenting on the function
of an Indian reservation, Justice Douglas has said:
[C]ongress has attempted to give this tribe an economic base
which offers job opportunities, a higher standard of living,
community stability, preservation of Indian culture, and the
orientation of the tribe to commercial maturity.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 162 (1973).
168. In his dissent in Northern States Power Co., 50 F.P.C. 753, 777
(1973), Commissioner Moody states:
It is my conclusion that we cannot, as a matter of law
make the essential finding required by 4(e). By treaty and
by statute, the Lac Courte Oreille Band has been given sovereignty over tribal lands; this was, and continues to be, the
"purpose for which such reservation was created.' With the
Band's unequivocal rejection of use of tribal lands by Northern
States or any Commission licensee for power purposes, we
have no lawful basis for the issuance of a license.
169. See text accompanying notes 163-65 supra.
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of Indian sovereignty is the proper "backdrop" for interpreting
particular treaties and statutes affecting Indian interests,17 0 then
the tribal sovereignty definition of reservation purpose emerges
as the appropriate premise from which to determine whether a
power project interferes or is inconsistent with the purpose of
the reservation.

B.

IMPLEMENTATION OF A TRIBAL CONSENT REQUIREMENT

Although a reservation purpose approach and an in parn matema approach both support a tribal consent requirement, the
two approaches differ in scope. Since the reservation purpose
analysis does not directly rely on the IRA, it would not incorporate the distinction between executive order reservations and
treaty or statute reservations nor would it require a tribe to
ratify a constitution. Instead it would recognize the sovereignty
of all Indian tribes on all reservations and their corresponding
power to prevent the licensing of power projects on their tribal
lands. The rights of an Indian tribe under a reservation purpose
analysis would be similar to Indian water rights and thus not
dependent on reservation status. Moreover, under a reservation
-purpose analysis the principle of tribal sovereignty would be elevated to doctrinal status and conceptually merged into the Government's trust relationship with the Indians. In this respect,
a reservation purpose approach would be consistent with recent

congressional indications that the promotion of tribal sovereignty
is a significant feature of the Government's trust responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the definition of the Government's trust responsi-

bilities is legislative in nature, and the potentially expansive
implications of a reservation purpose analysis would not be congruent with the Supreme Court's traditionally conservative role
in the area of Indian law.

Thus the realistic approach to a tribal consent requirement
would be to interpret the licensing conditions of the FPA in pari
materia with the tribal powers under the IRA. This approach
would be more limited in scope since the consent requirement
would not extend to tribes on executive order reservations or
to tribes without ratified constitutions. The tribal sovereignty
principle would operate as a "backdrop" for an in pari materia
interpretation and would provide additional force to the presumptions against abrogation and implied repeal. Moreover, an
170. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S: 164 (1973).
See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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in pari materia analysis would be consistent with the Supreme
Court's emphasis on "individualized treatment of particular
treaties and specific federal statutes."
A strict holding that tribal consent is required when power
projects are licensed on tribal lands does not provide the flexibility needed for those occasions when the withholding of tribal
consent might be arbitrary or improvident. Judicial review of
the tribe's decision would best respond to this need. Section 4(e)
of the FPA states that each license "shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary [of the Interior] shall deem
necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of such reservations."'171 If the Secretary of the Interior were to subject
a license involving reservation lands to the condition that tribal
consent must be obtained prior to licensing, the courts could indirectly review a tribe's decision. If the FPC should appeal the
withholding of consent for a project it would have the burden
of proving that the Secretary's adherence to the tribe's decision
was an abuse of administrative discretion. Thus, an Indian tribe
would be able to negotiate with a power company from a position of strength, knowing that its decision to reject a proposal
would be upheld unless it were clearly arbitrary or would result
in irreparable injury to the public. Although the Department
of the Interior has not been an effective protector of Indian interests, it is beginning to demonstrate a renewed sensitivity to
the protection of Indian land and water rights. If the Department adheres to its stated policy of increasing "involvement and
self determination in the management by the Indians of their
resources,"' 172 the contribution of its expertise and influence to
the licensing procedure could promote the type of mutually beneficial contract between an Indian tribe and a power company
that has characterized leases of Indian lands for nonpower pur173
poses.

171. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
172. See Hearings on Federal Leasing and Disposal Policies Before
the Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 651 (1972).
173. The Secretary implemented a tribal consent requirement during the recent licensing of the Montezuma Power Project in the Gila
River Indian Reservation in Arizona. See Hearings, supra note 9, at
1692,

